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Gulley: The Enhanced Arbitration Appeal Amendment: A Proposal to Save Ame

NOTE
THE ENHANCED ARBITRATION APPEAL
AMENDMENT: A PROPOSAL TO SAVE
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE FROM
ARBITRATION, MODELED ON THE ENGLISH
ARBITRATION ACT OF 1996
I.

INTRODUCTION

Arbitration, once relegated to commercial parties and disdained by
the courts, has realized an expansive place in our adjudicatory regime.'
Even the local consumer who wishes to exterminate a termite infestation
may find herself shunted to arbitration in a dispute with the
exterminator.2 Our modem arbitral system, and its restrictions on
judicial review, reveals a simple3 truth: "Arbitration is power, and courts
are forbidden to look behind it."
This Note does not seek to resurrect discarded judicial hostility
toward arbitration. This Note does, however, ask lawmakers and
practitioners to reinvigorate a suspicion of arbitration-to ask why we
send almost any claim to a binding, private, non-precedential resolution,
and what effect this practice has on our jurisprudence.
To save our "way of law" from too much of a good thing, we must
alter our approach to the judicial review of arbitral awards. Arbitration is
not likely to lose its allure, but if it is to be an integral part of a remedial
regime, arbitration must be brought into the fold.
1. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American
Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1946-47 (1996); Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel,
Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.

REG. 357, 370 (2002) (quoting Felton v. Mulligan, (1971) 124 C.L.R. 367, 385 (Austl.)) ("[B]y the
early 1970s, Judge Windeyer of the High Court of Australia felt confident enough to state that: 'the
grandiloquent phrases of the eighteenth century condemning ousting of the jurisdiction of courts
cannot be accepted in this second half of the twentieth century as pronouncement[s] of a universal
rule.').
2. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268-69 (1995).
3. Heinrich Kronstein, ArbitrationIs Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 661, 699 (1963).
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Critics of arbitration have rarely "focused directly on whether
arbitration in general ...is consistent with public justice. 'A Rather,
commentators have critiqued discrete effects of arbitration and
recommended novel reforms using tools found within the American

4. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1664 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping MandatoryArbitration].
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for change is growing and developing
experience. The agitation
6
considerable momentum.
An exemplary model for change is England,7 a nation with a long
history of arbitration and a recently minted arbitration code-the English

5. Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 241 (1992) ("There must
be a mechanism for the rediversion of issues of public policy and statutory construction back into
the courts. This can be handled at the front end by removing such issues from arbitration, or at the
back end by providing for judicial review of arbitration awards on such matters."); Robert Pitofsky,
Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1081 (1969) (recommending the
issuance of "written opinions including something like the findings of fact and conclusions of law
presently contained in... court opinions"); 3temlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note
4, at 1673 (positing a "thought experiment" of the formation of a controlled arbitration system with
governmentally appointed arbitrators); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 705, 710 (1996)
[hereinafter Stemlight, Panacea] (recommending increased state control of arbitration, yet
ultimately rejecting enhanced arbitral review by courts other than those avenues provided by the
FAA); Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the
Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 732 (2004) (recommending an amendment
to restrict arbitration of adhesion contracts); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 741 (1999) (challenging the Supreme
Court to either "(1) reverse its decisions that claims arising under otherwise mandatory rules are
arbitrable or (2) require de novo judicial review of arbitrators' legal rulings on such claims");
Michael A. Scodro, Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105
YALE L.J. 1927, 1959-60 (1996) (proposing "an amendment to the FAA to provide for a procedure,
analogous to federal-state certification, whereby parties can receive a federal court's decision on a
novel point of law raised in arbitration"). Professor William Park, argues that,
[a]t a later stage, the United States might consider replacing the existing grounds for
judicial vacatur of awards with at least part of the analogous provisions in the English
law. The clear emphasis on substantive excess of authority and serious procedural
irregularity, contained in sections 67 and 68 of the English Act, provide more focused
guidance for dealing with arbitral misbehaviour than the rather unsystematic scatter-gun
approach of section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act. In addition, at some point
American consumers of arbitral services should probably be given the option to have an
award reviewed for error of law, similar to the opportunity now provided under the
English statute.
William W. Park, The Interaction of Courts and Arbitrators in England: The 1996 Act as a Model
for the United States?, I INT'L ARB. L. REV. 54, 67 (1998). Similarly, Professor Jeffrey Stempel has
recently argued for the adoption of appellate review: "To the extent possible, arbitration awards
should receive appellate review as searching as that applied to court cases of similar magnitude and
complexity." Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations From Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV.
L.J. 251, 267 (2007). Because this Note posits that all errors of law should not be reviewed through
an appellate mechanism, and questions of fact should be not be reviewed by courts, this Note's
recommendation, although enhancing the possibility of arbitral appeal, is tailored to produce
precedent and enhance the common law.
6. See generally Jean R. Stemlight, Introduction: Dreaming About Arbitration Reform, 8
NEV. L.J. 1, 1 (2007) (introducing a major symposium devoted entirely to proposals for changes to
the American arbitral regime).
7. England and Wales have been part of the same legal system since 1536. See Laws in
Wales Acts 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 26 (partially repealed 1993). Although fully described as the law of
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Arbitration Act of 1996 ("Arbitration Act 1996").8 This Note proposes
an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), modeled on the
Arbitration Act 1996, to create an enhanced process of appeal from
arbitration awards in certain circumstances.
Part II briefly outlines the history of arbitration in the United States
and England, with an emphasis on significant changes that have
fundamentally altered arbitration in both countries over the last thirty
years. The problems of the American arbitration system are illustrated in
Part III, focusing primarily on the fundamental inadequacy of expansive
arbitration to continue the growth of the common law or provide clarity
through precedential statutory interpretation. Part IV contains the
recommendation to cure those ills: the Enhanced Arbitration Appellate
Amendment ("EAAA") and its procedural process. Finally, Part V is
devoted to potential arguments against the EAAA, rebuttals, and benefits
of adopting this Note's recommendation.
II. ARBITRATION: A HISTORY AND THE RECENT CHARGE TOWARD
OUR CURRENT REGIME

A. The Shared History of Arbitration in the UnitedStates and England
The United States inherited a legacy of law grown from common
law roots. 9 England was the progenitor of American common law' 0 and
from those shared roots also came arbitration. 1" Through much of our
history, we shared with England a distrust of a system that threatened to
oust the courts of their jurisdiction.' 2 During this period of judicial
"England and Wales or Northern Ireland," for the sake of brevity and clarity, all references will be
simplified as "English" or "England."
8. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23.
9. Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1914).
10. See generally Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L.
REv. 1003 (1985) (tracing the evolution of common law in England and colonial America).
11. Larry J. Pittman, The FederalArbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation,Stare Decisis, and a Proposalfor Change, 53 ALA. L. REv. 789, 796-97 (2002)
(noting the similar features of American and English arbitration in the early twentieth century);
Shelly Smith, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection
and the Circumvention of the JudicialSystem, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 1191, 1196 (2001). Arbitration is
ancient. See, e.g., Pittman, supra,at 793 (discussing the use of arbitration in the Medieval period).
12. The distaste of arbitration is said to stem from Lord Coke's decision in the Vynior's Case,
(1609) 8 Co. Rep. 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 598-600 (K.B.). See also John R. Allison, Arbitration
Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public
Policies, 64 N.C. L. REv. 219, 222-25 (1986) (noting the ancient nature of arbitration and the
antagonism of the English common law system beyond that of other formal legal systems);
Drahozal & Friel, supra note 1, at 367 (quoting Horton v. Sayer, (1859) 4 H. & N. 643, 157 Eng.
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hostility, lasting well into the twentieth century, it was not uncommon
for arbitrators to "interact[] with the courts in rendering their awards. 13
American judicial antipathy to arbitration, and the sharing of
responsibilities between United States courts and their arbitral
counterparts, changed dramatically in the twentieth century. 14 This
movement, which also shifted the American practice away from the
English, has been characterized by its most important feature:
judicial
[are] almost entirely insulated from
"[A]rbitrators
6
intervention."'' 5 The FAA codified this new understanding.'
B. Arbitration in the UnitedStates
1. The Genesis of the Federal Arbitration Act and Arbitration
Thereafter
Prior to the adoption of the FAA in 1925, arbitration in the United
States was a distrusted, maligned, and circumscribed practice.' 7 The
legislative history of the FAA has recently come under close academic

Rep. 993, 996) ("Under traditional English common law, a contractual clause that purported to oust
the jurisdiction of the courts was void as being contrary to public policy. As Pollock CB stated, 'the
superior courts of law cannot be ousted of their jurisdiction by the mere agreement of the
parties ... '); Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47
HARv. L. REv. 590, 591 (1934) ("Business arbitrations may be essential, but proper balance and
strict control by the courts is imperative.").
13. Scodro, supra note 5, at 1940.
14. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (holding that
an arbitration tribunal should decide questions of arbitrability in the first instance).
15. Scodro, supranote 5, at 1940.
16. The Federal Arbitration Act was originally titled the Unites States Arbitration Act. See
Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)); see
also Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 256 (1987); Phillips, supra note 12, at 596-97 (providing a
humorous and extensive list of subjects once specially reserved for arbitration by piecemeal
legislation).
17. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Tobey v.
County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story, J.); see also Drahozal & Friel,
supra note 1, at 374.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 17
1100

HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 36:1095

scrutiny, 18 revealing an adoption process fraught with compromise and

gloss. 19
Julius Henry Cohen, a lawyer from New York, spearheaded the
incarnation of the FAA that shuttled from committees to the floor of
Congress and passed into law.20 Cohen, a practitioner at the forefront of
New York's arbitration work, was active in state associations and
committees. 21 New York had one of the more expansive arbitration
statutes, adopted in 1920.22 The FAA, modeled on the New York
statutes, was intended to improve the lot of American business by
"cut[ting] the Gordian knot of the law's delay., 23 This philosophy was
acknowledged in Cohen's comments before the Joint Hearings of the
Senate and House Subcommittees.24
Despite the FAA's advance, arbitration in America initially
remained a little used dispute resolution device. 25 Indeed, until the mid1950s, arbitration was tied to the fundamental contractual relationship of
commercial parties, existing only when parties sought commercial
contracts containing arbitration clauses.26 The understanding of these
parties indicates that arbitration was "not considered [a] surrogate[] for
adjudication in a court of law.",27 The narrow reach of arbitration would
change dramatically in the ensuing decades, with the Supreme Court

18. Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
FederalArbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101-10 (2006);
Pittman, supra note 11, at 825-30; Imre S. Szalai, The FederalArbitration Act and the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 319, 340-42 (2007); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the FederalArbitrationAct, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931,
986-87 (1999).
19. Moses, supra note 18, at 110; Szalai, supra note 18, at 342. But see Christopher R.
Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the FederalArbitration
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 101, 107 (2002) (addressing legislative history of the FAA and
arriving at the conclusion that the FAA was intended be applied to state courts).
20. Moses, supra note 18, at 102-10. The Supreme Court recently addressed the legislative
history of the FAA. See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 n.7 (2008).
21. Moses, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that Cohen served as general counsel for the New
York State Chamber of Commerce).
22. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
REv. 265, 266 (1926) (citing 1920 N.Y. Laws ch. 295).
23. Id.; see also Moses, supra note 18, at 102.
24. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: J. Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the
Comms. on the Judiciaryon S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) (statement of Julius Henry
Cohen).
25. See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 986 (2d Cir.
1942); Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues Under the
Revised Uniform ArbitrationAct, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67,67-68 (2001).
26. Hayford, supranote 25, at 67-68.
27. Id.
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unleashing the binds, perceived and judicial, on arbitration.2 8 The
Supreme Court does not appear to ground its expansive arbitration
decisions on the FAA's legislative history; as Justice O'Connor
commented in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,29 "the Court has
abandoned all pretenses of ascertaining congressional intent with respect
to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own
creation. '' 3°
Modem American arbitration is almost unrecognizable from its
disfavored ancestor. As summed up by Professor Thomas Carbonneau,
arbitrators are now "entitled, as a matter of law, to rule upon securities,
RICO, civil rights, and any other type of claim, no matter what the
import to the public interest .... Modem arbitration under the FAA is
far removed from the dispute resolution process envisioned between
sophisticated commercial parties enjoying relative parity. 32 Simply put,
"the bandwagon may be on a runaway course." 33 To check that runaway
coach, courts are currently provided with few options under the FAA.
2. Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards under FAA
Section 10(a)
The FAA secured the arbitral solution from courts of law jealous
and protective of their jurisdiction. In doing so, however, the FAA also
28. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006); Doctor's
Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 281 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37
(1985); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07
(1967).
29. 513 U.S. at 265.
30. Id.at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the recent case of Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel,
Inc., 128 S. Ct 1396 (2008), Justice Souter discussed the work of Congress prior to the adoption of
the FAA. Id. at 1406 n.7. Justice Souter's footnote (which was not joined by Justice Scalia) may
signal a return to legislative history when the Court is presented with a question under the FAA.
Justice Souter's conclusion that the legislative history supports a limitation of party ability to
contract for expanded judicial review beyond section 10(a) of the FAA will likely be open to
intensive future critique, particularly when that conclusion is set parallel to arguments supporting
the primacy of party autonomy. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit
Expanded JudicialReview ofArbitrationAwards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214, 214 (2007).
31. Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 1955; see also Jay R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of
Inarbitrabilityand Public Policy Checks on U.S. and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of
Control?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1661, 1676 (1991) (illustrating similar expansive jurisdiction).
32. Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 409-10, 414 (Black, J., dissenting).
33. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668, 668 (1986). There are intimations that the jurisdiction of arbitrators is growing yet more
expansive. See Szalai, supra note 18, at 322 (addressing circuit split "whether a federal court's
jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement under the FAA may be based on the federal nature
of the underlying dispute to be submitted to arbitration").
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limited the corrective possibility of appeal.3 4 It is important to address
the options currently accommodated by the FAA to review the award of
an arbitration panel before reaching this Note's proposal to alter the
review process.
The only judicial allowance for vacatur of an arbitral award made
explicit in the FAA is found in section 10(a) of that Act.35 The
enumerated provisions do not allow an appeal on the merits of the
dispute.36 Under a literal reading, section 10(a) is not an appeal of the
dispute at all-merely an opportunity for a court to correct gross
procedural errors.37 Each of the provisions speaks to the composition and
conduct of the panel, rather than to the nature of the dispute or merits of
the action. 38 Absent statutory provisions, courts were constrained, when
presented with an unsavory arbitration award, to create novel vacatur
review standards outside of those provided in the FAA.
3. Non-Statutory Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards
Despite the express grant of judicial review for only those reasons
contained in section 10(a), a number of circuit courts have recognized
the existence of "nonstatutory" grounds for vacatur. 39 Among the
recognized grounds are "a 'manifest disregard' of the law by the
arbitrator, a conflict between the award and a clear and well established
'public policy,' an award that is 'arbitrary and capricious' or 'completely
irrational,' and a failure of the award to 'draw its essence' from the
parties' contract. ' 4° Every circuit but the Federal Circuit allows vacatur
outside the grounds allowed by section 10(a).4
Those circuits recognizing non-statutory grounds for arbitral
vacatur base their opinions on a dated and overruled case from the

34. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 22, at 273 ("There is no authority and no opportunity for the
court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should have been.").
35. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
36. Id.
37. See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 116
(1992) (arguing that even the original champion of the FAA, Julius Henry Cohen, allowed for "a
remarkably active role for the courts in preserving procedural protections for the arbitral parties").
38. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
39. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:Judicial Standardsfor Vacatur of Commercial
ArbitrationAwards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 739 (1996).
40. Id.
41. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between ReasonedAwards and the JudicialStandardsfor Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 443,461 (1998).
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Supreme Court: Wilko v. Swan.42 With increasing confusion, circuit
courts stretch and warp the dicta of Wilko to accomplish vacatur of
awards deemed to lack procedural or substantive backing.43
C. Arbitration in England
The "sceptered isle" has a long and storied history of arbitration.4 4
Courts in England regularly and loudly rebuffed the advance of
arbitration.45 Objection to arbitration in England eventually sublimated
into statutory control, yet English courts remained entitled to interfere in
the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.46 England has continued to update
its statutory regime for arbitration, reflecting changing attitudes and
relationships with arbitration.47
1. England's History of Statutory Control
The courts of England, as condoned by governing statute, exercised
great power over arbitration; these statutes served to "control the
substantive norms that arbitrators appl[ied]" to the dispute. 48 As early as
the mid-nineteenth century, the "special case" practice had emerged,
"whereby [arbitrators] rendered their awards in the form of alternative
outcomes, leaving it to the courts to choose among them based on their
judgment about specified legal questions that had arisen during the
arbitration." 49 Additionally, courts exercised the "common-law
42. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481, 485 (1989). For an example of Wilko's use, see
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Wilko in
a determination of the doctrine of manifest disregard as applied to arbitral review).
43. James M. Gaitis, Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v. Swan: American Arbitration
Vacatur Law and the Accidental Demise of Party Autonomy, 7 PEPP. DISp. RESOL. L.J. 1, 2-3
(2007); Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of Labor Arbitration and Commercial
Arbitration:An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 781, 870-71 (2000).
44. See Park, supra note 5, at 64.
45. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 n.14 (2d Cir.
1942) (quoting Scott v. Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1138, 5 H.L.C. 811, 853 (H.L.)
(commentary of Lord Campbell)).
46. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 21 (allowing parties to seek court
intervention through the "statement of [the] case" procedure).
47. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23; Arbitration Act 1979, c. 42; Arbitration Act 1975, c. 3;
Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27; Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125;
Civil Procedure Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 39.
48. Scodro, supranote 5, at 1940.
49. Id.Somewhat surprising when juxtaposed against our current antipathy to judicial review
of arbitration awards, the special case once found limited purchase in the United States. Under an
old version of Massachusetts's law, questions of law "may" be referred to a court; this lenient
"may" transforms into a "shall" upon request of all parties. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 20 (1959).
Additionally, if a party sought review "before the award becomes final ...the superior court may in
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power... to set aside awards for an error of law or fact on the face of
the award ... ,50
With the adoption of the English Arbitration Act of 1979
("Arbitration Act 1979"),51 the "special case" practice fell away.52 In the
time between the Arbitration Act 1979 and the adoption of the
Arbitration Act 1996, judicial review of arbitration awards went through
a number of permutations. 3 In 1982, the House of Lords handed down
its decision in The Nema,54 restricting the intervention of national courts
severely in "one-off' arbitrations.55 The Nema outlined a standard of
limited judicial review, which, along with its companion case three years
later, The Antaios,56 was largely adopted in England's latest codification
of arbitral law.57
2. Arbitration under the English Arbitration Act of 1996
The Arbitration Act 1996 was a shift in England's arbitration
paradigm.5 8 Commentators have been generally warm to its
modifications. 59 The Arbitration Act 1996 seriously curtailed the

its discretion instruct the arbitrator or arbitrators upon a question of substantive law." MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 251, § 20 (1959). Illinois' original arbitration act was modeled on England's
contemporary. Phillips, supra note 12, at 614. Connecticut and Pennsylvania also enjoyed slightly
modified forms of England's arbitration act. Id.
50. Okezie Chukwumerije, Reform and Consolidation of English Arbitration Law, 8 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 21, 43 (1997).
51. Arbitration Act 1979, c. 42.
52. Id. at § 1(1) ("In the Arbitration Act 1950 ... section 21 (statement of the case for a
decision of the High Court) shall cease to have effect .... ").
53. See generally Paul A. C. Jaffe, The Judicial Trend Toward Finality of Commercial
Arbitral Awards in England, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 67, 72-86 (1989) (discussing Arbitration Act 1979
and judicial review thereafter).
54. Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd. ("The Nema"), [1982] A.C. 724 (H.L. 1981).
55. Id. at 742-43. A "one-off' arbitration involves a contract that was specifically negotiated
between parties, as opposed to the standard contract forms often employed in general commerce.
See Jaffe, supra note 53, at 68 n.4. The Nema established that leave to appeal from an arbitration
award varied according to the type of case at issue. Id. at 74-75.
56. Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederiema A.B. ("The Antaios"), [1985] A.C.
191, 203-04 (H.L. 1984). The Antaios reaffirmed the holding of The Nema and further clarified
access to appeal to the higher courts. See Jaffe, supra note 53, at 76-77.
57. CMA CGM S.A. v. Beteiligungs-KG MS "Northern Pioneer" Schiffahrtsgesellschaft
mBH & Co., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1878, (2003) 1 W.L.R. 1015, 1024-25 (C.A.).
58. Tom Birch Reynardson, Reconciling Cost Control With Justice, I INT'L ARB. L. REV.
115, 115 (1998); see also Lord Saville, The Arbitration Act 1996: What We Have Tried to
Accomplish, 13 CONSTRUCTION L.J. 410,410 (1998).
59. Oliver Browne, London v. Paris: TerritorialCompetition in InternationalCommercial
Arbitration,7 INT'L ARB. L. REv. 1, 6 (2004) ("Since 1997... English law has established itself as
being amongst the world's more progressive arbitration regimes.").
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opportunity of a court to interfere with the proceeding of arbitration. 60 In
short, the "inherent jurisdiction of the courts" is no longer sufficient to
justify intervention.6 1
Judicial control of arbitration in England may now be divided into
two species: assessment of the arbitral procedure and review of the
award.62 When a court addresses arbitral procedure, it is "concerned
[with] ...ensuring that the tribunal is independent and free from bias,

that it acts within its jurisdiction, that the parties are given equal
opportunity to present their respective cases and that the arbitration
otherwise conforms with the mandatory procedural laws of the seat of
arbitration., 63 In its review of the arbitral award, the English courts are
controlled by section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.64 A restriction on
the jurisdiction of the courts was clearly intended by the drafters:
We have very severely limited the right to apply to appeal from an
arbitration award.... You have to demonstrate that the arbitrator was
obviously wrong, or in a case of general public importance, that his
conclusion was at least open to serious doubt.... You can only apply
to appeal on a point of English law.... You will not be able to appeal
on questions of fact dressed up as questions of law.... More

importantly still, we have inserted... 69(3)(d) of the Act ...[so that it
must be] "just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to
determine the question." This new provision means that over and
above the court being satisfied that the tribunal was obviously wrong
in law, or (in a case of general importance) that its conclusion was at
least open to serious doubt, there will have to be something else which
makes it just and proper for the court to substitute its own decision for
that of the tribunal. This should, and is intended to make successful
applications
for leave to appeal from an arbitration award very rare
65
indeed.

As illustrated by the foregoing commentary by Lord Saville, the
final portion of section 69 is intended to further limit the interference of
national courts, as "just and proper" circumstances must be weighed
against party autonomy and intent. 66 There is some indication that courts

60. Chukwumerije, supra note 50, at 27.
61. Id. (noting that jurisdiction for court interference is now allowed only where so provided
by the Act).
62.

Id at41.

63. id.
64. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69.
65. Saville, supra note 58, at 412 (quoting Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 § 69(3)(d)).
66. Id.
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have taken the 67new boundaries to heart, avoiding interference and
limiting appeals.
Section 69 is not a mandatory provision of the Arbitration Act
1996.68 To opt out of section 69, parties must do so by express written
69
agreement or grant the panel leave to make its award without reasons.
There is some authority that section 69 will be unavailable if parties
select a set of arbitration rules incorporating an exclusion of appeal.70
Procedurally, section 69 is simple to follow. Section 69(2) allows
an appeal from an arbitral award if all parties to the arbitration agree. 7 1 If
the parties to the arbitration are unable to agree, the permission to appeal
will be granted by the court "only if the court is satisfied ... that the
determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or
more of the parties ....
Upon a finding that the question substantially
affects the rights of a party, permission to appeal from the arbitration to
the court will be granted after the arbitration panel issues its award, "on
the basis of the findings of fact in the award," in two circumstances:
first, "the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong" or
second, "the question is one of general public importance and the
decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt. . . .,M The
threshold for permission is lower if the party seeking appeal is able to
convince the court of the presence of a "question of general public
importance. 74 The lowered standards for appeal provided in the
Arbitration Act 1996 are compensation for the hurdle presented by the
test derived from The Nema: The presumption that an appeal from an
arbitral award is improper in all but the most extreme circumstances.75
67. CMA CGM S.A. v. Beteiligungs-KG MS "Northern Pioneer" Schiffahrtsgesellschaft
mBH & Co., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1878, (2003) 1 W.L.R. 1015, 1021 (C.A.) ("So far as [this court
is] aware, this is the first time that permission to appeal to this court has been granted pursuant to
section 69 of the [Arbitration Act 1996].").
68. Taner Dedezade, Are You In? Or Are You Out? An Analysis of Section 69 of the English
ArbitrationAct 1996: Appeals on a Question of Law, 9 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 56, 59 (2006).
69. Id. at 60; see also Park, supra note 5, at 62. The possibility of exclusion is a significant
development: "Under the Arbitration Act 1979, there was an ability to exclude the right to appeal on
a point of law but such rights were restricted, in relation to domestic agreements, special categories
and statutory arbitrations." Dedezade, supra note 68, at 59.
70. See Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impregilo SpA, [2005] UKHL 43, (2006) 1 A.C.
221, 224-25 (H.L. 2005); Steven Friel, Excluding the Right to Appeal Under s.69 of the Arbitration
Act 1996 by Reference to the Rules of an Arbitral Institution, 9 INT'L ARB. L. REV. N26, N26

(2006).
71. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69(2)(a).
72. Id § 69(3)(a); Dedezade, supra note 68, at 63.
73. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69(3)(c); Dedezade, supra note 68, at 63.
74. Dedezade, supra note 68, at 64.
75. Id.
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The appealing party must clearly state a question of law to the court
and explain why the appeal should be granted.76 The court may decide
whether to grant the appeal with or without a hearing." Under the
Arbitration Act 1996, there is a presumption that a hearing is not
necessary or allowed.78 This presumption, however, is not always
followed. 79 The appealing party makes its request of the court at some
risk: "On an appeal under this section the court may confirm the award,
vary the award, remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for
reconsideration in the light of the court's determination, or set aside the
award in whole or in part."80 The court's decision on the appeal is
treated as a final judgment and is therefore granted limited appeal. Only
if "the court considers that the question is one of general importance or
is one which for some other special reason should be considered by the
Court of Appeal.'
III.

SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT ARBITRAL REGIME
OF THE UNITED STATES

The American approach to arbitration is troublesome for five
important reasons: (1) it cripples the ability of our courts to make the
precedents that support our common law foundation and statutory
interpretations; (2) arbitration tribunals are not required (outside of
discrete exceptions) to publish reasons for their awards, thus denying
public and legislative response to arbitration awards; (3) the statutory
grounds for vacatur, and the judicially created non-statutory grounds for
vacatur, are chaotic and often in conflict; (4) the pre-emptive nature of
the FAA limits the ability of states to expand judicial review of federal
or state issues; and (5) parties may not contractually expand
opportunities for judicial review when agreeing to arbitrate. Each of
these escalating problems will be addressed in turn. When combined,
these problems necessitate an amendment to the FAA to create a process
of enhanced arbitral appeal.

76. Id. at 66.
77. Id.
78. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 § 69(5).
79. See Dedezade, supra note 68, at 66-67.
80. Id. at 66.
81. Arbitration Act 1996, § 69(8); see also Henry Boot Constr. Ltd. v. Malmaison Hotel Ltd.,
[2000] 3 W.L.R. 1824, 1826 (C.A. 2000); Dedezade, supranote 68, at 66.
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Precedent:An Embattled and EndangeredFoundation

American law is one of common law roots.82 The law is founded
upon stare decisis and statutory interpretation by the courts.8 3 The
continued growth of the common law and the interpretation of statutory
law are threatened by the unabated proliferation of arbitration. 84 The
threat comes from a single truth: Arbitration does not make law.
Although an arbitration tribunal may use adjudicatory tools such as
discovery, witnesses, and reasoned awards, any award by the tribunal
may not be relied upon as precedent.85 At one point, the Supreme Court
recognized the distinction between simple contractual claims and claims
implicating a public interest: "[Arbitration] cannot provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting.., federal statutory and
constitutional rights ....
,86 The Supreme Court has dynamited its earlier
stopgaps, releasing a flood of arbitration.8 7 This section will demonstrate
the strangulation of court precedent in three areas of the law: antitrust,
employment discrimination, and securities. Before these individual
branches of the law are assessed, however, it is necessary to look at the
entire tree and ground specificity in general theory.
In an influential article, Professor Owen Fiss laid out a challenge to
the practice of court avoidance:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers chosen
by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which the
82. Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE
L.J. 36, 36 (1944).
83.

BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921).

84. Kronstein, supra note 82, at 36 ("The growth in the United States of this extra-legal use of
arbitration, subject at no juncture to judicial supervision, should challenge the complacent and stir
those who would place public interest before private gain."); Jean R. Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a
Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that
of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 835 (2002) (noting that a hallmark of mandatory,
binding arbitration is the "eliminati[on] [of] the claimant's right to present claims to a judge or
jury[,] ...[thereby] preventing litigants from setting public precedents").
85. Allison, supra note 12, at 240; Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The
Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1107 (1993); Mitchell H.
Rubinstein, Altering Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 235,
262.
86. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (announcing this limitation of
arbitration in the context of § 1983 claims); Smith, supra note 11,at 1222-23. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has stated that "arbitral procedures [are] less protective of individual statutory rights
than are judicial procedures ....
" Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744
(1981).
87. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (discussing
arbitration precedent); see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983) (declaring that federal policy favors arbitration).
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public participates. These officials, like members of the legislative and
executive branches, possess a power that has been defined and
conferred by public law, not by private agreement. Their job is not to
maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace,
but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative
texts such as the Constitution and statutes:
to interpret those values and
88
to bring reality into accord with them.
Professor Fiss leveled his critique against settlements; 89 arbitration
is readily analogous to settlement. The comparison is compelling: like
settlement, arbitration is intended to facilitate the whims of private
parties. 90 Furthermore, the practice of arbitration takes from the courts
the disputes that will allow the court to hear and decide. 91 Judge Harry
Edwards expressed similar concern: "An oft-forgotten virtue of
adjudication is that it ensures the proper resolution and application of
public values. In our rush to embrace alternatives to litigation, we must
be careful not to endanger what law has accomplished... ,92 Judge
Edwards further framed the issue when he warned, "by diverting
particular types of cases away from adjudication,
we may stifle the
93
development of law in certain disfavored areas.
The proponents of the FAA conceded that the new arbitration
regime was "simply a new procedural remedy" and therefore not outside
of the broader adjudicatory framework. 94 A contemporary to the drafting
of the FAA addressed the alternative dispute resolution system with
trepidation:
Strongly as I favor arbitration, we, as lawyers, must never forget that
our law is an inheritance from all the ages. We have worked out certain
definite principles, certain definite rights, certain definite remedies.
They are subject to improvement; they are subject to clearer statement;
they are subject to greater exactness; and they are subject to enormous
improvement in their practical application, but I do not think we are
ready to throw them overboard and to substitute for them the arbitrary
88. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
89. Id.
90. Margaret M. Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of

Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429, 429 (2004) (remarking that "[a]rbitration is a private
system ofjustice, made possible by the parties' consent").
91. Fiss, supranote 88, at 1085.
92. Edwards, supra note 33, at 676. The economic foundation for public adjudication has
been equally well-demonstrated. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a
PrivateGood, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 236-40 (1979).
93. Edwards, supra note 33, at 679 (recognizing civil rights, family law and the legal rights of
the poor as such "disfavored" areas).
94. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 22, at 279.
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unappealable will95of a single individual entrained perhaps in this our
legal inheritance.

This eloquence is particularly potent in our current age of
expanding arbitration. We are witness to the creeping engulfment of
once-inarbitrable subjects by arbitration. 96 Even the driving force behind
the FAA, Julius Henry Cohen, acknowledged that "[n]ot all questions
arising out of contracts ought to be arbitrated... [i]t is not the proper
method for deciding points of law of major importance involving
constitutional questions or policy in the application of statutes. 97 The
inarbitrable subjects featured in Cohen's commentary-cases involving
constitutional questions and statutory interpretation-are exactly those
subjects now featured in arbitration.9 8
The danger of arbitration may be simply drawn: "Public policy
issues need public resolution." 99 Arbitration is not a public process. °°
Some commercial actors choose arbitration, at least in part, for its
confidential nature. 01' This privacy comes at a price: courts are unable to
prune the law, the public is denied an understanding
of law applications,
02
and Congress is unaware of problematic statutes.1
Courts are allowed to act only when confronted with a "real party"
04
to a controversy. 0 3 A federal court may not issue advisory opinions.1
Without a real party in interest, and the facts presented in the
proceeding, a federal court may not interpret the law. Arbitration takes
95. Address of United States Circuit Judge Julian Mack (Nov. 19, 1925), in 7 LECTURES ON
LEGAL TOPICS 1925-1926, at 107 (Assoc. of Bar of the City of N.Y. eds., 1929).
96. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (holding
claim under Securities Act of 1934 arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1985) (holding antitrust claims arbitrable); Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (holding that claims must be split between
arbitration and litigation in the presence of an arbitration agreement); Sues v. John Nuveen & Co.,
146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding Title VII claim arbitrable).
97. Cohen & Dayton, supranote 22, at 281; see also Edwards, supra note 33, at 671-72.
98. Compare Cohen & Dayton, supra note 22, at 281 (noting that "[arbitration] is not the
proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions or
policy in the application of statutes") with cases cited supranote 28.
99. Cooper, supranote 5, at 241.
100. Ware, supra note 5, at 707-08.
101. Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the FederalArbitration Act:
The Casefor Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 157, 161 (1989).
102. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 42, 59 (1988) ("Ordering by public justice produces decisions resting on
considerations that transcend the immediate dispute and the immediate parties.").
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(l) (2007).
104. United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) ("As is well known, the
federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory
opinions.").
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the party from the court. Under the expanded interpretation of the FAA
by the Supreme Court, it has been argued that the Court has "delegated
10 5
to arbitrators what is essentially the judicial power of the State."
Absent any judicial review, when a court confirms the award of a
tribunal, "[it] adopts the arbitrator's decision as its10 6 own, and that
decision is enforced like any other ruling of the court."'
The court is a public institution: The proceedings, papers, and
decisions typically all become part of the public record. 10 7 In this
manner, the public is able to recognize and understand the law as
applied-to modify and check behavior accordingly. 108 The public learns
about applicable law from the dispute and acts as a court of public
opinion.10 9 In confidential arbitration, "something very wrong can
happen and be shielded from review."' 110 Arbitration, once a purely
commercial function, has become a confidential forum where questions
of great public importance are resolved.1 1 '
An arbitrator serves at the behest of the parties to the arbitration.
There is no compelling reason for the arbitrator to contemplate the
greater good or the public interest because the arbitrator does not answer
to the public as a member of government. 112 Under the rules of most
arbitration organizations, parties select the members of the arbitration
tribunal.113 Most arbitration organizations provide for a neutral arbitrator

105. Moses, supranote 18, at 144.
106. Ware, supra note 5, at 708.
107. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (discussing the
common law right to inspect and copy public records, including court records).
108. Cooper, supra note 5, at 214-15.
109. William W. Park,Amending the FederalArbitrationAct, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 75, 104
(2002) ("By their public nature, court cases often create behavioral rules to guide business conduct
outside a particular dispute."); Stemlight, supra note 84, at 839 ("When litigation is brought in
court, the public has the opportunity to learn about alleged illegal acts.").
110. Cooper, supra note 5, at 215.
111. Speidel, supra note 101, at 206 (noting that "unlike commercial arbitration, where the
limitations of arbitration may be strengths, statutory rights pose issues of public law which require a
vindication that arbitration may be unable consistently to provide"); Di Jiang-Schuerger, Note,
Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation?,4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 231, 242 (1999).
112. Bret F. Randall, Comment, The History, Application, and Policy of the JudiciallyCreated
Standards of Review for ArbitrationAwards, 1992 BYU L. REV. 759, 783 ("The arbitrator, often a
non-lawyer, is merely a contract-reader. She is entirely beholden to the parties and their contract.
While the judiciary should generally defer to the merits of an arbitration award, federal courts
should not abdicate their essential role of enforcing the laws of the land and representing the
public.").
113. See American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rule 12 (2007), available
at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440.
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to chair a panel of party-appointed arbitrators. 14 The selection of a
"neutral" arbitrator is an implicit recognition that a party's own selection
of an arbitrator necessarily leads to inferences of favoritism toward the
selecting party. A judicial assignment is1 5random, unbiased, and
traditionally free from intimations of conflict.'
Through the appellate process, the law is vetted and molded.11 6 The
courts are the check upon congressional action." 7 It is clear that federal
courts, under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution,'1 8 and state
courts, under the Supremacy Clause, 1 9 must follow the law of the land
when rendering their decisions. Because arbitrators serve at the behest of
the parties and are not bound by the Constitution, it is not certain that
arbitral awards must comport with the law. 120 Jurists have noted that
some sacrifices or procedure and process in arbitration are acceptable as
a function of party autonomy.
For the purposes of this discussion,
however, it is enough to note that regardless of the law used, the award
remains non-precedential. 122 In this manner, the scope of a piece of
legislation remains unaddressed. Even if an arbitration tribunal arrives at
the conclusion that the applicable law is inapplicable and therefore
denies one party recovery, that assessment will not be deemed
1 23
meritorious or subject to rejection through the appellate process.
Parties denied recovery are left questioning
the efficacy of arbitration
124
and the merit of congressional action.
114. Id. at Rule 13. The neutrality of these organizationally-appointed arbitrators has recently
come into question. See Nathan Koppel, Arbitration Firm Faces Questions Over Neutrality, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 21, 2008, at A3 (discussing suit against the National Arbitration Forum, Inc., alleging
that the arbitration provider favored debt collectors over consumers in arbitrations).
115. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Rules for the Division of Business Among District Judges
R. I (discussing the "Individual Assignment System" of the Southern District of New York),
availableat http://wwwl.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf.
116. Main Roger Scordato, Post-Realist Blues: Formalism, Instrumentalism, and the Hybrid
Nature of Common Law Jurisprudence,7 NEV. L.J. 263, 270 (2007).
117. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
118. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
119. Id. at art. VI, cl.
2.
120. Ware, supra note 5, at 719-21 (citing the survey contained in Soia Mentschikoff,
Commercial Arbitration,61 COLUM. L. REV. 846,861(1961)).
121. Am. Almond Prod. Co. v. Consol. Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944)
(Learned Hand, J.) ("They must content themselves with looser approximations to the enforcement
of their rights than those that the law accords them, when they resort to [arbitration's] machinery.").
122. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000); Allison, supra note 12, at 240.
123. For a recent example of this process outside the arbitration context, see Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (reversing the lower court and holding the applicable law
unconstitutional).
124. Professor Stemlight developed a compelling image in a recent article:
[An] analogy might be carbon monoxide, a gas which silently and secretly has a
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Congress, through the political process, can transform law to
accommodate the concerns reflected in a court's ruling. 25 Court rulings
serve an important social notice function.' 26 This notice is also important
to lawmakers. Congress, in the course of legislative compromise,
recognizes that "ambiguous statutory language" will later be interpreted
by the courts.' 27 If Congress does not agree with the application of law
on real parties, Congress can change the law.' 28 However, "[d]ecisions
intent, if they take place in arbitration, will
contrary to congressional
129
likely go unnoticed."'

The failure of precedent caused by unrestricted and unreviewable
arbitration is evident in three subject areas: antitrust, employment
discrimination, and securities.
1. Antitrust
The Sherman Act, 130 a collection of statutes designed to protect
competition, is of manifest importance to America's regulation of
commerce. 131 Indeed, "[t]he antitrust laws.., are at the very heart of
government economic policy.... [These laws are often] characterized as
a 'charter of freedom' possessing an almost constitutional status."' 32
Parties may bring antitrust actions as private attorneys general, giving

deleterious impact on the global environment. Permitting companies to use mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses to prevent consumers and employees from enforcing their
rights may ultimately have a devastating impact on the laws that are intended to ensure
that employees and consumers are treated fairly.
Stemlight, Out on a Limb, supra note 84, at 861.
125. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995), superseded by statute, Pub. L. 104208, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009-370 (1996) (amending law, after a finding of unconstitutionality by the
Supreme Court, to insert a nexus sufficient to accommodate Commerce Clause concerns).
126. Cooper, supra note 5, at 214.("How can a citizen know the commands of the law if its
elucidation is shrouded in secrecy? How can continuing content be given to the concept of
discrimination if arbitrators determine what is permissible or impermissible, yet only the immediate
parties learn what that is?").
127. John V. O'Hara, Comment, The New JerseyAlternative Procedurefor Dispute Resolution
Act: Vanguardofa "Better Way"?, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1746 (1988).
128. Sever, supra note 31, at 1678 ("[T]he Court has now read [the FAA] as creating an almost
untouchable and separate, decisionmaking [sic] institution ...[it is unclear] what such a separation
will mean for the parties involved in the arbitration and for the lawmakers who may wish to ensure
proper application of their laws.").
129. Scodro, supranote 5, at 1952.
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-37(a) (2000).
131. See Allison, supranote 12, at 231.
132.

Id.
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these actions a "semipublic"
nature because of the national economic
133
involved.
interests
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, InC., 13 4 the
Supreme Court held that an antitrust counterclaim was arbitrable in an
international commercial dispute. 135 The Court's decision effectively
undercut a long-standing public policy barrier36to antitrust arbitration,
resulting in an increase of antitrust arbitrations. 1
The move to arbitrate antitrust claims is an extraordinary
development in American jurisprudence. Arbitration and antitrust
enforcement had long been viewed as oil and water. 137 The public rights
envisioned by the Sherman Act were felt to have no kin in the private
enforcement mechanism of arbitration.1 38 The recent trend is also a
dramatic turn from39earlier cases espousing an outright distrust of
antitrust arbitration.

133. Id. at 232; Moses, supra note 18, at 139. See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505
F.3d 302, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2008 WL 117869 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008).
134. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
135. Id. at 635-37 (claim brought under the Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (Like the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act is one of the foundational competition laws.)).
136. Allison, supra note 12, at 235-37; Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History-What Have We
Learned About Private Antitrust Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LoY.
CONSUMER L. REv. 379, 406 (2004) (noting the increase of antitrust arbitration after the Mitsubishi
Motors decision).
137. See Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 1076-81.
138. Allison, supra note 12, at 235-37. Professor Allison eventually arguesfor the arbitration
of antitrust claims, noting, among other rationale, that antitrust law is no longer a fast-growing legal
field and litigation is "more of a refinement process." Id. at 241. I do not share Professor Allison's
willingness to sacrifice even this "refinement" to the unbound work of arbitrators. Even while
encouraging arbitration of antitrust claims, Professor Allison does not surrender the entire process:
he would allow limited court intervention (to allay party concerns) in the selection of arbitrators and
the legal standards employed by the panel. Id. at 270. Furthermore, recent decisions have
emphatically demonstrated that antitrust law is anything but staid. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007) (overruling 90-year old precedent and
holding that vertical retail price restraints are no longer per se illegal).
139. See, e.g., Univ. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 850-51 (7th Cir.
1983) (Posner, J.) ("Federal antitrust issues.., are nonarbitrable.... They are considered to be at
once too difficult to be decided competently by arbitrators-who are not judges, and often not even
lawyers-and too important to be decided otherwise than by competent tribunals."), superseded by
statute, Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4670
(1988) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2000)); Am. Safety Equip. Co. v. J.P. Maguire &
Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Since commercial arbitrators are frequently men drawn for
their business expertise, it hardly seems proper for them to determine these issues of great public
interest.").
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Arbitration affords parties limited discovery.140 Antitrust claims are
therefore particularly mismatched to arbitration because "much of the
information needed to prove that a monopolist is monopolizing is under
the control of the monopolist," and arbitrators may not have the power to
compel the necessary production. 141 Many of the private parties that
42
avail themselves of the antitrust laws have a contractual relationship.
As arbitration is inherently contractual, the contract is the carrier for the
arbitral epidemic endangering private antitrust action.
2. Employment Discrimination
The Supreme Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 4
held that a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEA") should be sent to arbitration when an agreement
existed between the parties) 44 45
After Gilmer, the use of arbitration in
employment disputes exploded. 1
The Court's opinion in Gilmer has been assailed for its failure to
address fundamental conflicts between the FAA (a private dispute
resolution method) and the petitioner's claims (pervasive discrimination
requiring public attention). 46 Employment discrimination arbitration
after Gilmer has also produced an arbitral system that is often
disadvantageous to individual employees. 147 Discrimination law is
140. Michele M. Buse, Comment, ContractingEmployment Disputes Out of the Jury System:
An Analysis of the Implementation of Binding Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace and
Proposals to Reduce the Harsh Effects of a Non-Appealable Award, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1485, 1498
(1995).
141. Moses, supra note 18, at 140; see also Baker, supra note 136, at 406 (noting the
"practical" problem of discovery in antitrust arbitration "because facts are often so critical to
determining liability and/or damages").
142. Allison, supra note 12, at 232; see also Baker, supra note 136, at 406 (discussing the
prevalence of "horizontal agreements" between competitors). In an ironic recent development, a
lawsuit bringing claims against a cadre of credit card companies under the antitrust laws for
allegedly "holding secret meetings at which they colluded to require customers to sign away their
ability to take disputes to court and instead settle disagreements in arbitration" was reinstated by the
Second Circuit. Kathy Shwiff, Appeals Court Reinstates Credit-CardSuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26-27,
2008, at B2.
143. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
144. Id at 35.
145. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Advisory LaborArbitration Under New York Law: Does it Have a
Place in Employment Law?, 79 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 419, 437 & n.92 (2005); cf Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that the exclusionary clause of the FAA applies
only to transportation workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce).
146. Cooper, supra note 5, at 204 ("The unsatisfying superficiality of the opinion suggests a
Court less interested in principle than in reducing the workload of the federal judiciary.").
147. The procedural hurdles set before potential claimants have been well-summed:
[C]ompanies have drafted lopsided arbitration agreements that, for example, waive the
employee/consumer's right to recover punitive damages and attorneys' fees, cap the
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complex and often court-created; arbitrators may not have the expertise
to apply the law, and panels certainly do not
have the power to
48
law.
the
in
advances
new
necessary
promulgate
The Gilmer Court rested its decision, in part, on the arbitration rules
of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). 14 9 These rules require
arbitrators to issue written awards, to be place on file at the offices of the
NYSE.' 5" The Court justified its decision by analogizing party
settlement to arbitration-both avenues do not lead to precedent.' 51 The
Court felt that most ADEA claims would continue to be52litigated and
therefore arbitration would not threaten the growth of law. 1
The Court's refusal to accept a "death-of-precedent" argument is
troubling. There is no guarantee that "most" ADEA claims will continue
to be litigated. 153 The great number of employee contracts implicated by
the expansion of the FAA has the potential to engulf workers as diverse
as skilled laborers, temps, and CEOs. 154 Additionally, the parallels
between settlement and arbitration are not as closely tracked as the Court
would have us believe. Arbitration involves a quasi-judicial remedy in
which parties battle a controversy to a quasi-judicial solution. The desire
of a party to continue the battle before a fact-finder is the real source of
precedent.
There are indicia that lower courts have allowed the Court's
reasoning in Gilmer to invade employment discrimination claims
beyond the ADEA. 155 In particular, the arbitration of claims under Title
amount of consequential damages well below the amount permitted by statute, impose
shortened statutes of limitation, impose filing fees and their prohibitive costs on wouldbe claimants, require employees and consumers to submit their claims to arbitration
while leaving the company free to litigate, forbid class actions, restrict or eliminate
discovery, and give the company unilateral authority to appoint arbitrators.
Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a Uniform Federal
Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 583, 584-85
(2004); see also Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, at 1641-42 (noting
same).
148. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitrationand the Goals of Employment DiscriminationLaw, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395,396 (1999); Cooper, supra note 5, at 218-19.
149. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32.
150. Id.; Cooper, supra note 5, at 214.
151. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
152. Id.
153. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1996) (noting the
increasing prevalence of employment arbitration).
154. Lucy T. France & Timothy C. Kelly, MandatoryArbitration of Civil Rights Claims in the
Workplace: No Enforceability Without Equivalency, 64 MONT. L. REV. 449,491 (2003).
155. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding a
Title VII claim arbitrable). The tendency of arbitration to engulf claims under Title VII of the Civil
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") is troubling. Title VII is
"an attempt to address a systemic social ill-discrimination-that is
deeply embedded in the cultural fabric."' 56 As such, "adjudication... is
both an opportunity to reverse an instance of discrimination and an
occasion for examining the institutions that made discrimination
possible."'1 57 Additionally, Title VII claims have an "overlapping
system" of access to multiple forums. 58 Stripping Title VII claimants of
multiforum opportunities by compelling a single arbitral remedy
frustrates the design of Title VII.15 9
60
The claim in Gilmer was discrimination on the basis of age.'
Employment discrimination and other civil rights claims often turn on
the basis of other fundamental characteristics: race, gender, nationality,
and disability. 16' These suits should be remedied in full view of the
public "because societal problems such as discrimination need the glare
of litigation's public spotlight to increase awareness."' 162 The resolution
of civil rights claims in a court of law, and the subsequent public
discourse, "changes societal relationships."' 163 The resolution of
employment discrimination claims through arbitration starves the public
and the courts of opportunities for awareness and growth.
3. Securities
The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") collectively provide the

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2000), from the Supreme Court's
pronouncement of acceptable arbitration in ADEA claims is not altogether illogical as "the
substantive prohibitions of the ADEA were derived '[in] haec verba from Title VII.' G. Richard
Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitration an

"Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?,68 TEX. L. REv. 509, 571 (1990) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
156. Shell, supranote 155, at 568.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 568-69.
160. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
161. Jenifer A. Magyar, Case Comment, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration:Analysis
ofGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV. 641, 654-55 (1992).
162. Id. at 655. Particularly troubling is the reality that constitutional rights, rights often at the
heart of employment discrimination cases, need not be applied by arbitrators. See Brunet, supra note
37, at 99 (discussing Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir.)
(1986), wherein the circuit court "refused to require arbitrators to apply constitutional safeguards").
Additionally, arbitration clauses (even the more complex versions) typically do not include
constitutional rights inclusion provisions. Id. at 103.
163. Magyar, supra note 161, at 654-55.
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foundation of America's regulated economy." 6 At the time of the
adoption of the Acts, many felt that the collapse of the market in the
Great Depression could be traced to shady deals and opaque accounting
practices.' 65 The intent behind the Acts was to shed light on the
166
securities markets, as "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants."'
It is ironic that claims under these Acts are now being shunted to
arbitration, a private dispute resolution method, a method graced by less
sunlight than many bank vaults.
Securities law is noted for its reliance on development through
court decisions.' 67 The judicial cultivation of securities law led thenJustice Rehnquist to comment: "When we deal with private actions
under [the securities laws], we deal with a68judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn."'
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,169 the Court began to move toward
the modem relationship between securities law and arbitration. The
Scherk Court held that a claim involving an international commercial
transaction under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act was arbitrable. 170 In
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon,' 71 two customers brought
claims against a securities broker, alleging fraud under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, its regulatory counterpart, SEC Rule 10-b5, and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). 172 The
Court held that an arbitration agreement between the broker and the
customers precluded court action. 73 In a subsequent 74
case, the Court also
held claims under the Securities Act to be arbitrable.

164.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2000); see also STEPHEN J.

CHOI & A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 104 (2005).

165.

CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 164, at 104.

166.

Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (New

ed. 1932).
167. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding an
implied private cause of action in Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act).
168. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
169. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
170. Id. at 515-17, 519-20.
171. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
172. Id. at 223. RICO may be found at 18 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (2000).
173. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
174. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). Rodriguez
de Quiias overruled Wilko, thereby calling into question the manifest disregard doctrine. Id; see
also Brad A. Galbraith, Note, acatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court:
Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard"of the Law Standard,27 IND. L.
REv. 241, 249 (1993).
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A circuit court also found an arbitration agreement binding in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,' 75 in which an
investor sued his broker over a short-sale dispute.' 76 The SEC rule at
issue was not settled and there was little law on the application of the
rule. 77 An arbitrator on the panel commented that the claim came "down
to.. . a matter of interpretation of the law.., and we now hopefully
have to come up with the right answer on this law, and it is a very gray
area."' 178 Because "[a]n arbitrator cannot disregard law that is not
sufficiently clear and well settled," an award by an arbitration panel
applying unsettled law would79not be subject to judicial review under the
manifest disregard doctrine. 1
In 1991, Professor Norman S. Poser noted the prevalence of
arbitration agreements in the contracts between brokers and investors:
Today, arbitration has largely... replaced litigation as the method of
resolving disputes between customers and their brokers. A recent
report ...states that all of the nine largest brokerage firms, which, in
the aggregate, handle the accounts of about seventy-five percent of all
individual customers, require their customers to sign predispute
arbitration clauses when they open margin or option accounts. Thus,
customers who wish to borrow money from their brokers in order to
market,
purchase securities, or who wish to participate in the options
80
are almost always required to sign arbitration agreements.1
The numbers of securities arbitrations in our present day may be
assumed to represent an even greater percentage of disputes between
brokers and investors.' 8 ' Recognizing the prevalence of arbitration in the
securities industry, the SEC adopted uniform procedures governing
arbitration.18 2 Even the parties in the strongest bargaining position, the
brokerage firms, may be adversely affected by a lack of predictability
175. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
176. Id.at931.
177. Id.at933.
178. Id.(quoting arbitrator).
179. Scodro, supra note 5, at 1939.
180. Poser, supra note 85, at 1101 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES
ARBITRATION: How INVESTORS FARE 28 (1992)).
181. Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of the Eligibility Rule in Securities
Arbitration: The FurtherAggravation of Unequal BargainingPower, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 109, 11819 (1996) (finding that arbitrations by securities organizations increased 800% between 1980 and
1994); Poser, supra note 85, at 1100-01 (noting that between 1985 and 1990, the number of
arbitrations sponsored by securities organizations rose from 2800 to 5300).
182. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use
of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21144,
21144-55 (May 16, 1989).
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due to an absence of judicial precedent in securities law. 183 Following
the Court's imprimatur of securities arbitration, there has been a
"marked decrease in court decisions addressing broker-customer
184
relations, resulting in a freeze of the relevant law."'
The expanding arbitration of antitrust, employment discrimination,
and securities disputes are examples of the withering of American
common law. However, a dearth of precedents is not the only disorder
stemming from the American arbitral regime.
B. ReasonedAwards are Uncommon and Unwelcome in American
Arbitration
American arbitrators typically do not issue written rationales for
their awards.185 Indeed, some arbitral organizations actively discourage86
their arbitrators from writing the reasoning behind an award .
Curiously, the United States is one of only a few nations that issues
arbitration awards 87in the absence of written findings of fact or
conclusions of law.'
Absent reasoned awards, "[t]he parties and their counsel are
provided no reliable indicia of whether the arbitrator's decision was
founded on a full understanding of the material facts and a proper
interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of their contract
and the applicable law."' 88 A judge, when presented with an award
unaccompanied by findings, commented: "For all we know, the
arbitrators concluded that the sun rises in the west, the earth is flat, and

183. Poser, supra note 85, at 1110; see also Summers, supra note 5, at 710 (noting the same
irony in employment arbitration).
184. Park, supra note 109, at 105-06.
185.

MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 29:06, at 435-36 (Rev. ed.

2002).
186. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cooper, supra note 5, at 215. This practice may be
changing in certain circumstances and under certain organizations. See American Arbitration
Association, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, Rule 34(c) (2005),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22075 (requiring a written award absent a contrary
request by the parties); A.B.A., DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARB. OF
STATUTORY DISPs. ARISING OUT OF THE EMP. RELATIONSHIP 3 (1995), available at

http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/special/protocol.pdf.
187. Eric van Ginkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial Review:
Arbitral Appeal vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 157, 214 (2003).
188. Hayford, supra note 41, at 447.
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damages have nothing to do with the intentions of the parties
or the
' 89
foreseeability of the consequences of a [contractual] breach."'
Some critics have called for action, requesting reasoned awards in
certain situations.19° One scholar commented: "[H]ow can we build up a
unified system of commercial law and practice and code regulation
unless [reasoned awards] are used? Without them we have a hodgepodge
of nothingness, and business is not helped nor arbitration aided by the
mistakes or wisdom of others." 191 The absence of reasoned awards hurts
commercial parties because it does not instruct them how to modify
future behavior or structure future transactions. 192 The absence of a
reasoned award may even encourage parties to seek court vacatur, as the
93
losing party is unable to assess the foundation of the award. 1
C. Statutory Groundsfor Vacatur,and Judicially CreatedNonStatutory Grounds, are Chaotic and Often in Conflict
In a weighty article, Professor Stephen L. Hayford demonstrated,
circuit by circuit, the messy standards for both statutory and nonstatutory vacatur of arbitration awards. 194 There is "substantial
disagreement" between the circuits about whether judicially-created
grounds for vacatur are viable.' 95 This confusion is compounded by the
189. Perini Corp. v. Great Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 392 (N.J. 1992) (Wilentz,
C.J., concurring), abrogatedby Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc, 640 A.2d 788,
791-93 (N.J. 1994).

190. Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment
and Callfor Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 343, 404 (1995) (recommending reasoned
awards upon request of the parties); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63
IND. L.J. 425, 486 (1988); Galbraith, supra note 174, at 261 (advocating the use of written opinions
only when requested by parties, lest arbitration become too similar to litigation).
191. Phillips, supra note 12, at 606.
192. Park, supranote 109, at 104.
193. Hayford, supranote 41, at 447.
194. As described by Professor Hayford:
Four circuit courts of appeals can be described as being in a state of extreme confusion
with regard to the non-statutory grounds for vacatur: the Sixth, Ninth, Fifth, and Seventh.
The case law in each of those four circuits contains one or more unequivocal assertion
that the exclusive grounds for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards are those set
forth in section 10(a) of the FAA, juxtaposed with one or more opinions recognizing and
applying a non-statutory ground for vacatur.
Hayford, supra note 39, at 764-65. Professor Hayford has since updated his survey of the courts,
noting that twelve of thirteen circuits, with the exception of the Federal Circuit, now recognize some
form of non-statutory vacatur. Hayford, supranote 43, at 870.
195. Hayford, supra note 39, at 746. To date, "[o]nly the Fourth Circuit has unequivocally
rejected the nonstatutory grounds for vacatur." Id. at 764 (citing Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32
F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995)) ("The statutory grounds for
vacatur permit challenges on sufficiently improper conduct in the course of the proceedings; they do
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"increased willingness" of the circuit courts to go beyond arbitral awards
and assess the reasoning and interpretation of the merits of the disputes
before them. 196 The circuit courts appear to be in a "struggle[]" to reach
a proper
standard of review, a debate not yet resolved by the Supreme
97
Court.

1

International experience indicates that despite the commercial
desire for finality, parties in arbitration sometimes desire a "safety net"
of judicial review.' 98 The FAA should be amended to alleviate the
confusion and forum shopping inherent in conflicting circuit standards
99
by enunciating clear opportunities and guidelines for court review. 1
D. Because of the Preemptive Nature of the FAA, States are Unable to
Effectively Modify JudicialReview ofArbitration
The application of federal or state law to an arbitration agreement
"can have substantial - even determinative - impact.., on the outcome
of a case. 2 °° In Southland Corp. v. Keating,2 °' the State of California
learned a tough lesson: the Supreme Court held that a California statute
reserving certain claims from arbitration was preempted by the FAA.20 2
Ten years later, when the Court granted certiorari in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson20 3 to resolve another question of federal law
preemption, twenty state attorneys general filed amici briefs to have
Southland overturned.20 4 The Court refused, holding the Alabama law at
issue preempted by the FAA, expanding the scope of the FAA to
regulate all "commerce in fact., 20 5 The FAA, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, is an exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause

not permit rejection of an arbitral award based on disagreement with the particular result the
arbitrators reached.").
196. Hayford, supra note 39, at 735-36.
197. Galbraith, supranote 174, at 250.
198. Park, supra note 109, at 104 (citing CODE JUDICIAIRE Art. 1717(4) (Belg.) (enacted in
1985, amended on May 19, 1998)).
199. van Ginkel, supra note 187, at 212 (recommending same, with Arbitration Act 1996, c.
23, § 68(2) as a model for a "more extensive list of grounds on which an award can be set aside").
200. Henry C. Strickland, The FederalArbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement:
What's Left for State ArbitrationLaw?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 410 (1992).
201. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
202. Id.at 16.
203. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
204. Moses, supra note 18, at 129.
205. Stemlight, Panacea, supra note 5, at 665 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at
281).
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authority.2 °6 As such, the FAA is applicable to both state and federal
207
courts. Any state arbitration law contrary to the FAA is preempted by
the affirmative act of Congress in this area if the dispute is deemed a
federal case.20 8 Even state laws that attempt to increase the awareness of
arbitration clauses by consumers are suspect. 20 9 If change is to come in
the American arbitral regime, it must come from Congress.
E.

Partiesare Unable to ContractuallyExpand JudicialReview of
ArbitrationProceedingsand Awards

An amendment to the FAA to accommodate expanded judicial
review is crucial in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision limiting
the ability of parties to expand contractually the judicial review of their
arbitral awards.2 10 Arbitration is fundamentally a contractual exercise.211

206. Hayford, supra note 25, at 69; Stemlight, Panacea,supra note 5, at 665-66. At the time of
adoption, the FAA was not so clearly within Congress's Commerce Clause power. As noted by
Julius Henry Cohen, "[The FAA] rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is
authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts. So far as congressional acts relate to the
procedure in such courts, they are clearly within the congressional power. This principle is so
evident and so firmly established that it cannot be seriously disputed." Cohen & Dayton, supranote
22, at 275.
207. Hayford, supra note 25, at 69.
208. As noted by Professor Hayford:
Read in concert, Southland, Perry, Terminix, and Casarotto confirm that the FAA
preempts state law conflicting with any of its terms. The substantive law of commercial
arbitration is that set out in the Federal Arbitration Act, at least with regard to the issues
expressly addressed in the FAA. The state courts are obliged to apply that law, even in
the face of contrary state statutory or case law. This line of cases repeatedly signals that
the Supreme Court will not tolerate efforts by state legislatures or state courts to
undermine the seminal purpose of the FAA--the enforcement of contractual agreements
to arbitrate.
Hayford, supra note 25, at 71 (listing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 265; Doctor's Assocs. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)); see also Stemlight, Panacea,supra note 5, at 665-67 (same). The
one exception to the preemptive power of the FAA is insurance; under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000), states may regulate "without fear of federal preemption."
Stemlight, Out on a Limb, supra note 84, at 841; Strickland, supra note 200, at 447. The Supreme
Court recently held that "state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial
or administrative, are superseded by the FAA." Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008).
209. See Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688 (invalidating a Montana statute requiring
commercial parties to place a notice of arbitration on the first page of any contract). For a
particularly vitriolic response to the trend of expansive arbitral jurisdiction and federal preemption
under the FAA, see the special concurrence by Justice Trieweiler in the decision by the Montana
Supreme Court reversed by the Court in Doctor's Assocs. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931,
939-41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).
210. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008); see also Kevin A.
Sullivan, Comment, The Problems of PermittingExpanded JudicialReview of ArbitrationAwards
Under the FederalArbitration Act, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 509, 510 (2002) (noting a circuit split over
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Despite the desire of some parties to expand judicial review of
arbitration decisions by contract, party autonomy is not recognized in
this area.212 Without congressional action to amend the FAA, party
contractual expansion of the judicial review of arbitration awards is
futile.213
F. Conclusion: The JudicialReview ofArbitrationAwards Must
Change
Standards for review of arbitral awards under the FAA are
substantially identical to their original incarnation. 1 4 The FAA provides
a mere "skeletal structure" for the regulation of arbitration in the United
States. 2 '5 The growth of arbitration has been driven entirely by the
decisions of the Supreme Court, yet the FAA has not changed with the
times. 2 16 Put succinctly, "[t]he Act is... ill-suited to such use as an allterrain vehicle. 2 17
To satisfy the great need for clarification and consistency, for-profit
arbitral institutions, such as the American Arbitration Association and
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc., have promulgated
rules for commercial arbitrations.2 18 The piecemeal nature of these rules,
despite their popularity, is "not an effective substitute for well thoughtout legislative reform. 2 19
Enhanced arbitral appellate review cannot be founded in the current
form of the FAA, or squeezed into the non-statutory grounds for vacatur.
To accomplish expanded review, Congress must act to amend the
FAA.220

"whether parties to an arbitration agreement could agree to federal court appellate review of an
arbitration award").
211. JEAN-FRANCOIS
POUDRET
& SEBASTIEN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 1.1.1, at 3 (2007).

BESSON,

COMPARATIVE

LAW

OF

212. Hall Street Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1403; see also Rubinstein, supra note 85, at 247-53
(collecting and discussing cases both for and against contractual expansion of judicial review);
Jiang-Schuerger, supranote I l, at 232-33 (same).
213. Hall Street Assocs., 128 S. Ct at 1403; see also Sullivan, supra note 210, at 560.
214. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669, 669-74 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ I15 (2000)).
215. Hayford, supra note 25, at 68; Cole, supra note 30, at 214.
216.

Ware, supra note 5, at 712-13.

217.
218.
219.
220.

Park, supra note 109, at 76.
Hayford, supra note 25, at 68.
Id.
Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 11, at 248.
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IV.
A.

A RECOMMENDATION

FOR REFORM

The EnhancedArbitrationAppeal Amendment ("EAAA

")

Since American courts dramatically changed perspective on the use
of arbitration, little has been recommended to reconcile the American

stance with its English counterpart.22 1 Commentators have gazed
longingly across the waters to England and ultimately shied away from
dramatic reform.222
Arbitration in England has been altered over the course of the
twentieth century by amendments to the Arbitration Act-each
substantially changing the English approach to arbitration. 223 Arbitration
in the United States has flourished not from continued tweaking of the
FAA, but from the changing interpretation of the FAA by the courts of
this country.224 The FAA is long overdue for an overhaul.2 25
The stewardship of American law by the courts, despite the
increasing use of arbitration, will be best served by an amendment to the
FAA. This Note proposes an amendment to section 10 of that Act. The
proposed amendment, to immediately follow section 10(a), would read:
(b) An arbitral award must be in writing, accompanied by reasons for
the award sufficient to allow judicial review;
(c) A district court may engage in enhanced judicial review of an
221. See Park, supranote 5, at 55 ("Measured by the plumb lines of both efficiency and justice,
the syncretistic legislation offers an optimal balance of finality and fairness in private dispute
resolution. Contemplating this impressive achievement, thoughtful American lawyers are likely to
ask whether English-style arbitration reform would succeed in the United States."); see also van
Ginkel, supra note 187, at 219 (describing the Arbitration Act 1996 as "well thought out, fairly
complete, and accessible").
222. See Phillips, supra note 12, at 610-11; see also Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to
CorrectArbitral Error-An Option to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 103, 112-13 (1997)
(critiquing the Arbitration Act 1996 in the context of U.S. judicial non-statutory review of
arbitration awards); van Ginkel, supra note 187, at 219 (arguing that the Arbitration Act 1996 could
be a model for improvements to the FAA, but stating that "[c]ontrary to the provision under the
English Arbitration Act for arbitral appeal by leave of the court only on questions of law and only
when certain conditions have been met, a somewhat more open system of appeal may be preferable
for the United States"); Park, supra note 5, at 67 ("[A]t some point American consumers of arbitral
services should probably be given the option to have an award reviewed for error of law, similar to
the opportunity now provided under the English statute."); Scodro, supra note 5, at 1961
(acknowledging English arbitral law, but ultimately arguing for a certification process for novel
questions of law arising in an arbitral context, similar to the current process from federal courts to
state courts).
223. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23; Arbitration Act 1979, c. 42; Arbitration Act 1975, c. 3;
Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27.
224. See Sternlight, Panacea,supra note 5, at 664.
225. See Stemlight, Dreaming,supra note 6, at 1.
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arbitral award when:
(1) parties mutually agree to submit an appeal; or
(2) a question of law substantially affects the rights of a party and;
(a) the appeal raises a novel question of law, or
(b) the question of law implicates a matter of general public
significance;
and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt.
The remainder of this Note will discuss the structure of this appellate
process and the benefits of enhanced arbitration appeal.
B. Modelsfor Standardsof Review
Despite its absence in the United States, the possibility of appeal
from an arbitral award is not rare among nations.226 The courts of those
states allowing appeal center the threshold inquiry on whether "the
question of law will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the
parties, or that the point of law is of general public importance. 2 27
Section 69 of England's Arbitration Act 1996 is the best model for
an amendment to the FAA. This is not an arbitrary model: England has
long been a world center for arbitration. 228 Our English counterparts
seem to understand that the growth of common law requires fertilizing
and weeding.22 9 We should not, however, adopt section 69 wholesale.2 30
The remainder of Part IV will discuss: (1) the procedural aspects of
an appeal and the results of a denied application; (2) the definition of a
question of law; (3) the definition of a novel question of law; and (4) the
definition of a question of general public significance.
1. The Procedure of the New Arbitral Appellate Process
An appeal under the EAAA would follow the intention of
Arbitration Act 1996 section 69 in large measure, but fit within the
United States federal appellate process. A party seeking appeal would
226. van Ginkel, supra note 187, at 194-96 (noting unlimited appeal in Belgium and France
(for domestic arbitrations only) and limited appeal in England, Australia, Hong Kong (for domestic
arbitrations only), New Zealand, and Singapore "if the court finds that certain conditions have been
met").
227. Id.
at 196.
228. Browne, supranote 59, at 1.
229. Frederick A. Mann, Private Arbitration and Public Policy, 4 CIV. JUST. Q. 257, 267
(1985) ("[lit is in the highest interest of the State, that it is a matter of public policy of great import
to maintain a principle of judicial review of arbitration not only to develop the law, but also to
ensure the administration ofjustice and thus to avoid the risk of arbitrariness.").
230. Park, supra note 109, at 77-78 ("Part of the peculiar U.S. genius has been our ability to
adapt (rather than adopt) inventions from abroad.").
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petition a federal district court for review in the situs of the arbitration
(in the district in which the arbitration panel was constituted). Appeal
would also be possible in a federal district court situated in the
jurisdiction in which a party seeks to enforce the arbitral award. 231' The
appeal could begin only after the tribunal reaches its final award. In this
manner, courts avoid intrusion into the competence of tribunals, while
still serving as a check on the question of law at issue.232 Unlike the
ability of parties to opt out of section 69 review under Arbitration Act
1996,233 parties would be unable to close out court review. The key
rationale behind the EAAA is to rectify the drought of precedent.
Allowing parties to avoid court review by agreement will not resolve
that problem. An opt-out provision may place greater strain on the
already disparate bargaining positions of many employees and
consumers forced to arbitrate. The unavailability of an opt-out provision
will be tempered by the strictures discussed below.
This appeal process would look similar to the process of appeal
from a circuit court to the Supreme Court.234 The process of petitioning
for leave to appeal is crucial to the EAAA: An appeal remains a
discretionary function of the court and not a unilateral claim of right by
the appealing party.235 Appeal would automatically be granted, however,
if the arbitral parties mutually agreed to submit an appeal.236 Because an
amendment to the FAA expanding judicial review must implicate the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, parties seeking review
must comport with the strictures of diversity and amount in
controversy. 237 It is also essential for the continued development of

231. Kanowitz, supra note 16, at 273 ("Review of an arbitration award by a court of first
instance may also be referred to as an appeal.").
232. In this procedure, my amendment is distinct from a prior proposal for the adoption of a
process, similar to a "certified question" from a federal court to its sister state court during the
course of an ongoing arbitration:
[l]f a party to a private arbitration raises a statutory claim that she believes would
constitute a novel question for the federal courts, she may ask the arbitrator to certify
that question to a federal district court. It is for the arbitrator (1)to make the factual
determination of whether the legal claim is dispositive of the case, given the facts as she
finds them, and (2) to examine case law presented by the parties or that she herself
discovers to determine whether the question is novel.
Scodro, supranote 5, at 1959-60.
233. Browne, supra note 59, at 3, n.18.
234. 28 U.S.C §§ 1253, 1254, 1257, 2101 (2000).
235. SUP. CT. R. 10 (2007).
236. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69(2)(a).
237. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). As noted in one critique of the FAA: "Parties do not
automatically have a federal case merely because they have brought arbitration decisions to a
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precedential opinions to maintain a vehicle for parties to reach the court
on disputes involving a federal question.238
The United States appellate procedure, governed by statute,239 will
also apply to a denial of an appeal by a district court. United States
circuit courts draw a distinction between an interlocutory matter and a
final decision: Only when a decision "leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment" will a circuit court take review.240 If a district
court accepts a party's appeal of an arbitral award under the EAAA, a
district court decision would clearly be a final decision. However, like
the English appeal, there will be an additional hurdle: Appeal from the
district court to the circuit court is not one of right; therefore, the district
court must certify that the question is one which should be granted an
appeal.24 '
2. The Subject Matter of the New Arbitral Appellate Process
It is important that a district court's inquiry remain centered on a
"question of law." Arbitration is best as a fact-finding institution.24 2 The
court should not disturb pure questions of fact. Of course, even the
about the distinction between a question of
English courts have bandied
243
law and a question of fact.
Under Arbitration Act 1996, a "question of law" is defined simply
as a domestic law of England. 2 4 The practical effect of this simple
definition is important: "[The] cases seem[] to . . . delimit the questions
of law which can be appealed to questions of English law. These cases
support the proposition245that awards based on applicable foreign law are
likely to be excluded.,
Appeals under the EAAA would be limited to questions of law
arising from the law of a state or the laws of the United States. The
Supreme Court appears cognizant of the need to maintain province over

federal court under the FAA. A federal court may not hear an arbitration case unless diversity or a
federal issue dispute exists." Jiang-Schuerger, supranote 111,at 238.
238. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367 (2000).
239. ld §§ 1291, 1292.
240. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945), superseded by statute, 9 U.S.C. § 15,
Pub. L. No. 100-669, 102 Stat. 3969 (1988).
241. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69(8).
242. Cohen & Dayton, supranote 22, at 281.
243. Stewart R. Shackleton, Annual Review of English Judicial Decisions on Arbitration2000, 4 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 178, 194 (citing Whistler Int'l Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.
("The Hill Harmony"), [2001] 1 A.C. 638, 647 (H.L. 2000)).
244. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 82(1).
245. Dedezade, supranote 68, at 62.
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United States law in international arbitration. 246 District courts must
dismiss appeals under the new amendment absent a question implicating
United States law. Additionally, the question of law asserted by an
appealing party must be either a novel question of law or a question of
general public significance.
a.

Novel Questions of Law

The adjudication of a novel question of law is the opportunity of a
court to announce, by its opinion, a new standard or test. 24 7 An
opportunity for appeal on a novel question of law is not currently
available under the Arbitration Act 1996.248 Appeals on novel questions
of law must, however, be allowed and thereby ensure the growth of our
law. A novel question of law is not easily defined. Novel questions of
law are alternately described as questions of first impression. Often,
these questions are "call 'em when you see 'em." It is the burden of the
party seeking appeal to convince the district court that the question at
issue raises a novel question of law.249
b.

Questions of General Public Significance

A question of law implicating general public significance should,
by its very nature, be reviewed in a public forum. Because the
importance of questions of public significance is clear, recommendations
to keep these questions from the scope of arbitration have been made for
United States arbitration. 250 The subjects discussed previously-antitrust
employment discrimination, and securities-often involve matters of
public importance. It is important, however, to establish a high threshold
for the determination of a question of general public significance, lest
appeal become too commonplace and burdensome. Similar to an appeal
for a novel question of law, it will be the burden of the party seeking
appeal to impress upon the district court the general public significance
of the question. Although a novel question of law may often be
characterized as a question of general public significance, the terms are
246. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985)
(recognizing that domestic courts would have the opportunity, at the award enforcement stage, to
review the application of national antitrust law).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659 (1992).

248. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 69.
249. Cf Demco Invs. & Commercial SA v. Se Banken Forsakring Holding Aktibolag, [2005]
EWHC (Comm) 1398, [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 650, 658 (Q.B.D. 2005).
250. Kronstein, supra note 82, at 68 (arguing "that government and private parties be permitted
the right to appeal to the courts in all arbitration cases provided the public interest is affected").
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not synonymous and a distinction should be made between the two
avenues for appeal.
3. Awarding of Costs to a Party as a Cautionary Tool
As a cautionary measure, the costs of the appeal may be levied
against the party unsuccessfully seeking appeal. Imposition of costs
against a party is traditionally appropriate where a party brings suit on a
frivolous or obviously weak claim.2 5' A party should only appeal the
decision of an arbitration panel with good cause. A district court's
refusal to accept an appeal from an arbitration award may thus be treated
as a frivolous or overtly meritless attempt to prolong the dispute. The
imposition of costs will force parties to adequately sound their
arguments for appeal before making that significant step.
4. Reasoned Awards Must Become a Crucial Component of
American Arbitral Practice
If the EAAA is to be successful, district courts must have some
basis for a grant of appeal. This foundation may be set upon the
procedures of the EAAA and a new requirement for arbitrators to
provide parties with a reasoned award. In prior practice, courts often
refused to review arbitral awards because courts could not assess the
rationale for the award and thus were uncomfortable extending their
review into the realm of the arbitration panel's competence.2 52 Reasoned
awards are not common in American arbitration, but they are not an
oddity. 3 America appears to be one of the few countries in which
reasoned awards are not prevalent in arbitration. 4 It is time for the
United States to bring its practice of arbitration to the level of the
international community.

251. This is a long-standing traditional power of appellate courts. See, for example, MC. &
L.M Ry. Co. v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379, 387-89 (1884), in which the court held:
Here the plaintiffs in error wrongfully removed the cause to the Circuit Court.... its
effect is, to defeat the entire proceeding which they originated and have
prosecuted.... [I]n order to give effect to its judgment upon the whole case against
them, to do what justice and right seem to require, by awarding judgment against them
for the costs that have accrued in this court.
Id.; see also Hochman, supranote 222, at 115.
252. Brunet, supra note 37, at 88.
253. Id. at 89 (1992) (noting that is it "customary practice" for labor arbitration panels to write
opinions).
254. van Ginkel, supra note 187, at 214.
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THE BENEFITS FROM ENHANCED APPEAL OF ARBITRAL AWARDS

A. PromotingPrecedent
Enhanced appellate review of arbitral awards will promote the
continued development of American law. As elucidated by Professor
William Park, "judicial review of awards on the legal merits of the
case... fertilizes legal development by creating a publicly available
'legal capital' of new principles to meet changing commercial
circumstances. 25 5 The English system long demonstrated a desire to
encourage the development of the common law through court interaction
with arbitration. 256 The success of the English approach to the
development of precedent was noted during its use. 25 Indeed, some feel
that the English system now restricts the development of English law too
much. 258 The United States, because of its liberal arbitration policies,
desperately needs a mechanism to maintain the "fertilization" of our
common law.259
Some scholars are more restrained in their assessment of the state
of American precedent. Professor Christopher Drahozal notes that "it is
the rare case that contributes to the development of the law in a
significant way. 26 ° Professor Thomas Carbonneau has found that only
about seven percent of employment arbitration awards are "equivalent of
substantial judicial opinions on employment law," with the remainder
constituting "purely factual determinations., 261 Mandatory arbitration of
customer-broker disputes does not appear to have dramatically slowed
the flow of court cases.262 However, cases such as Bobker,263 in which
255. Park, supranote 109, at 105.
256. Dedezade, supranote 68, at 59.
257. Phillips, supra note 12, at 616 ("The opinions rendered in special cases seem to have
helped make law not only for other arbitrations, but for general usage as well.").
258. Paul Ardetti, a member of a Committee that drafted a generally positive critique of the
Arbitration Act 1996, excepted from the Committee's report:
I differ from this conclusion [that no changes to the Arbitration Act 1996 are necessary)
as follows. The quality of the Common Law underpins the success of this jurisdiction,
both in arbitration and the Court, and the Act is too restrictive of the timely development
of the Common Law. This has not changed as a result of the survey. Some updating of
the Act therefore continues to be of paramount importance to arbitrators, lawyers and the
parties they serve, in my view.
REPORT ON THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996 (2006), at 23 n.2, available at
http://www.idrc.co.uk/aa96survey/Report-onArbitration Act 1996.pdf.
259. Park, supra note 109, at 105.
260. Christopher R. Drahozal, Is ArbitrationLawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 187, 209 (2006).
261. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1183, 1205 (2004).
262. Poser, supra note 85, at 1102.
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the law is unsettled, demonstrate the continued growth of American
precedent: Not all questions of law are answered; every statute has not
been interpreted. The crucial matter is not the number of cases that fall
into arbitration or reach a court or the percentage of disputes involving
significant matters, it is the importance of each case and its effect on
precedent.
In recent years, some federal courts have adopted the practice of
issuing unpublished or non-precedential opinions. 26 Circuits using
selective publishing have adopted rules to determine when decisions are
published; for example, the Federal Circuit's rules are designed to
promote precedents, particularly in cases of first impression or general
public interest.265 The cases captured by the publication rules are the
exact disputes that encourage precedent and promote the development of
the law.
With the adoption of the Arbitration Act 1996, England limited the
right to appeal an arbitration award.26 6 It is important to note, however,
that the right to appeal under Arbitration Act 1996 has not been entirely
lost.267 Under the Act, England still offers a "split-level approach to

263. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986).
264. See FED. CIR. R. 47.6; Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Casenote, Please Ignore this Case: An
Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions in the FederalCircuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013,
1013-14 (2004) ("The Federal Circuit disposes of many cases without publishing opinions. In fact,
the Federal Circuit issues an average of 77% of its opinions as 'unpublished' decisions ....
265. As compiled by Ms. Shaw:
According to the Federal Circuit's Internal Operating Procedures, the court publishes
opinions meeting one or more of the following criteria:
(a) The case is a test case.
(b) An issue of first impression is treated.
(c) A new rule of law is established.
(d) An existing rule of law is criticized, clarified, altered, or modified.
(g) A legal issue of substantial public interest, which the court has not sufficiently treated
recently, is resolved.
(i) A new interpretation of a Supreme Court decision, or of a statute, is set forth.
(j) A new constitutional or statutory issue is treated.
(k) A previously overlooked rule of law is treated.
(n) A panel desires to adopt as precedent in this court an opinion of a lower tribunal, in
whole or in part.
Zeitlin Shaw, supranote 264, at 1017 (citing FED. CIR. R. INTERNAL OPERATING PROC. 10).

266. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, §§ I(b), 69.
267. Richard Clegg, The Role of Courts in Arbitration, 16 CONSTRUCTION L.J., 462, 463
(2000) ("With respect to appeals of general public importance, the test in the 1996 Act of 'open to
serious doubt' would appear to be a lower test than the former 'strong prima facie case'. To that
extent, the 1996 Act has widened the door to appeals.").
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judicial review" in which parties may exercise an "optional right to
appeal points of English law, coupled with a non-waivable opportunity
to seek judicial
review of an arbitration's fundamental procedural
268
regularity.
The limited arbitral appeal in England is, for most purposes, exactly
what United States arbitration needs. The criteria are such as to
"discourage all but the most serious of challenges .... Leave to appeal
will not be granted unless the arbitrators' decision is 'obviously wrong,'
or the question is one of269general public importance and the decision is
'open to serious doubt.'
B. PromotingClearArbitralDecisions
Along with the enhanced appellate process, the EAAA would
require arbitrators to provide a basic reasoned award, including a brief
statement of findings of fact, applicable law, and law application. A brief
reasoned award is useful for the future conduct of the parties, serving as
a guide to their commercial interactions. 270 As Professor Park notes,
"[a]nnulment of aberrant awards.., has an in terrorem effect that helps
to reduce problems at earlier stages, since most arbitrators are
understandably adverse to the public rebuke inherent in having their
awards vacated., 271 Additionally, with an enhanced appellate process in
place, courts may easily do away with the conflicting non-statutory
grounds for vacatur, as congressional intent would be clearly reflected in
the EAAA.272
The EAAA will not only help the courts, it will help lawmakers. As
statutory interpretations contrary to legislative intent go unnoticed in
arbitral proceedings, an enhanced appeal method will ensure that new or
controversial legislation is publicly interpreted.273

268. Park, supra note 5, at 55.
269. Id. at 62.
270. Park, supra note 109, at 104.
271. Id. at 98; see also Klaus Peter Berger, The Modern Trend Towards Exclusion of Recourse

Against TransnationalArbitralAwards: A European Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 605, 65657 (1989) ("The constant threat of judicial review along clearly defined criteria leads arbitrators to
pay due regard to the interests of the parties and factual and legal setting of the case, thus further
contributing to more legality in arbitral proceedings."). It is this Note's contention that "more
legality" in arbitration is, in fact, a good thing.
272. Hayford, supra note 39, at 842 (noting that the increased use of arbitration will also
increase the number of awards vacated on non-statutory grounds, eventually requiring the U.S.
Supreme Court to address those grounds); Park, supra note 5, at 67 (arguing that sections 67 and 68
of Arbitration Act 1996 may be used to defeat the current "scatter-gun" approach to vacatur).
273. Scodro, supra note 5, at 1952.
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C. PromotingArbitration
Enhanced judicial review under the EAAA will have beneficial
effects on arbitration as a dispute resolution method.2 74 The desire of
parties to seek arbitration will only increase with the knowledge that
arbitrators are likely to produce "good" awards.275 A statutorily
constructed arbitration appellate process allows parties to make
significant decisions regarding their choice of law provisions. Parties
may proactively avoid the potential problems inherent in an arbitration
award based on an unsettled law by avoiding that law, leaving
potentially problematic statutory constructs until the courts have a say.276
Arbitration, as a private dispute resolution mechanism, exists at the
behest of parties in a contractual relationship.277 Parties to arbitration are
believed to knowingly relinquish the right to pursue judicial remedies in
exchange for the speed, reduced cost, and finality of arbitration.278 Some
lament that expanding the opportunities for parties to appeal an
arbitration award to a court would give parties "a second bite at the
apple., 279 These critics argue that a party to arbitration is "stuck with the
result" of the arbitration, as long as the tribunal followed proper arbitral
procedures.28 °
The exchange of adjudication for arbitration does not, however,
replace one system of law for another. As the Supreme Court famously
noted:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom
for the
281
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.
The Supreme Court resoundingly supports arbitration, often with the
cachet of a reduced docket dangling before it. 282 The argument against

274. Sever, supranote 31, at 1696 ("[L]imited judicial review may prove essential to the health
and survival of both domestic and international arbitration.").
275. Park, supranote 109, at 98.
276.

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19

(1985) (noting party inclusion of a choice-of-law provision in an international contract).
277.
278.
279.

See POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 211, § 1.1.1, at 3.
Speidel, supranote 101, at 160; Sullivan, supra note 210, at 549.
Hayford, supra note 39, at 841; Hochman, supra note 222, at 113; Sullivan, supra note
210, at 509.
280. Hayford, supra note 39, at 841; Sever, supranote 31, at 1693 (noting same critiques).
281. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
282. Carbonneau, supra note 1,at 1957.
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expanded appeal therefore assumes that court review will dramatically
increase the time and expense of the dispute, along with the burgeoning
court docket.283 To the Supreme Court, "[i]t seems to matter little what
the ultimate implications are for individual rights or the institution of
arbitration., 284 The continued development of our system of law is
undoubtedly worth more than a court schedule. A congested docket is
better served by "new courts and
... the expenditure of additional public
285
resources upon the judiciary.,
Arbitration is intended, and assumed, to be cost-effective and
speedy.286 To avoid defeating these alleged benefits of arbitration,
federal courts have traditionally limited their review of arbitral
awards.287 As an initial matter, the purported benefits of arbitration are
not substantially supported by empirical evidence.288 The alleged speed
and frugality of arbitration are increasingly questioned as arbitration
becomes de rigueur. 289 The opportunity for judicial review, it is argued,
will destroy the benefit of finality. 290 However, the English arbitral
regime has not been so cavalier with the realities of arbitral finality:
The drafters
of the
[Arbitration Act
1996]
rightly
rejected... foreclosing the option of appeals, an approach that harshly
implies an irrebuttable presumption that parties to arbitration assume
283. Galbraith, supra note 174, at 259; Sullivan, supranote 210, at 551.
284. Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 1957-58.
285. Id.at 1957.
286. Cohen & Dayton, supranote 22, at 269; Kanowitz, supranote 16, at 255.
287. See Office of Supply, Gov't of the Rep. of Korea v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377,
379 (2d Cir. 1972); Galbraith, supranote 174, at 259.
288. Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 1959 (noting that as the scope of arbitration increased, "so
did lawyer participation in the process and the adversarial tenor of arbitral proceedings"); Kim
Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the FederalCourts, 76 IOWA L. REv. 889,
896 (1991) ("ADR (in federal districts using the system] has not resulted in speedier resolution of
federal civil cases, has not reduced backlogs, and has not affected the incidence of civil trials.");
Poser, supra note 85, at 1107 ("As the volume of cases [in securities arbitration] has increased,
delays of many months, or even a year or more, between the time of filing a demand for arbitration
and the time of the hearing have become the rule."); Summers, supra note 5, at 696-98 (comparing
filing costs of courts and arbitrations and finding that arbitration costs are not significantly less than
court costs). The critique of arbitration's devolution has come to the attention of the public media.
See, e.g., Richard Karp, Wall Street's New Nightmare: For Brokerage Firms, Arbitration Has
Turned Unexpectedly Nasty, BARRON'S, Feb. 21, 1994, at 15; Nathan Koppel, When Suing Your
Boss Is Not an Option, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at DI (discussing claims of sex discrimination
and rape by an individual employed in Iraq, subject to compulsory arbitration).
289. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding that HMO delayed appointment of neutral arbitrator until after plaintiff's death), rev 'd,938
P.2d 903, 925 (Cal. 1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, PursuingSettlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale ofInnovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991) (noting the
increasingly adversarial and legal nature of ADR).
290. Hayford, supra note 41, at 504.
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the risk that their arbitral awards might contain substantive errors.
Such a presumption is not founded on any empirical evidence that
arbitrating parties inevitably prefer finality to the right of appeal;
neither 29
is1 it necessarily supported by the legitimate expectation of the
parties.

To preserve the arbitration process from the courts, some have
recommended the use of arbitration appellate bodies.292 This option does
not rectify the stultification of precedent or significantly ameliorate other
concerns such as arbitrator bias or confidential outcomes.293
Dramatic change frightens many; legal professionals are certainly
no exception. Arbitration is a moneymaker-for the counsel involved in
the dispute and, through economic impact, for the host city and the
arbitrators.294 Practitioners and parties opposed to expanded arbitral
appeal claim that American arbitration would become so cumbersome
and unpredictable that commercial entities will sail for friendlier
shores.295 History may be full of migration, but the EAAA is unlikely to
inspire one. Indeed, there is authority that enhanced appeal may even
make a forum a more attractive situs for arbitration.29 6
The choice of an arbitral situs often depends on extra-legal
concerns. 2 97 For example, "[g]eography and history usually matter more
to the choice of an arbitral situs than the efficiency of the legal

291. Chukwumerije, supra note 50, at 46.
292. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 190, at 405-06.
293. van Ginkel, supranote 187, at 200-02 (dismissing the possibility of appeal to an appellate
arbitration body); Phillips, supra note 12, at 624.
294. Browne, supra note 59, at 6 ("Hosting a large number of arbitration proceedings brings
money into the economy of the host location and spotlights that location as a leading, sophisticated
legal centre, in turn bringing in even more money.").
295. Reynadson, supra note 58, at 115 (lamenting the plight of arbitration in London prior to
the adoption of the Arbitration Act 1996, with parties seeking New York as a more amenable seat).
296. According to Queen's Counsel V.V. Veeder: "[lI]t is an English oddity which has helped
to make English Commercial law the most useful and popular system of law in world trade. It
remains unthinkable that the symbiotic link should be broken between commercial arbitration, the
development of the English law and the English Commercial Court.
quoted in Dedezade,
supranote 68, at 59.
A compelling argument for the EAAA and its ability to attract arbitration may be the
"failed experiment" of Belgium and its mandatory "'non-review' of awards." Park, supra note 109,
at 104 (citing CODE JUDICIAIRE Art. 1717(4) (Belg.) (enacted in 1985, amended on May 19, 1998)).
Belgium sought to attract parties by adopting a regime disallowing all judicial review of arbitration.
Id. The regime proved unpopular. Id.; see also Bernard Hanotiau & Guy Block, The Law of 19 May
1998 Amending Belgian Arbitration Legislation, 15 ARB. INT'L 97, 98 (1999). Belgium
subsequently amended its law to allow for a default "safety net" of judicial review. Park, supranote
109, at 104.
297. Browne, supra note 59, at 4-5 (highlighting cost, culture, and competence as the primary
factors considered by parties).
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ENHANCED ARBITRATION APPEAL AMENDMENT

environment., 298 Both England and Switzerland enjoyed popularity as
arbitral seats while still enforcing enhanced review procedures in their
respective national courts. 2 99 The special case procedure drew
arbitrators' ire prior to its abolishment, 300 yet England's preeminent
position in modem maritime and insurance practice ensured a steady
stream of arbitrations.30
In a 2006 survey, practitioners resoundingly supported the retention
of the possibility of appeal under the Act.30 2 Of those who desired
change, the majority thought that "[section] 69 [was] too narrow at
present. ,30 3 Additionally, a 2003 survey by International Financial
Services revealed that "[m]ore international and commercial arbitrations
take place in London than in any other city in the world. 3 °4 Commercial
parties, despite the desire for finality, still desire correct decisions and
good law. The EAAA balances the commercial desire for finality and the
public desire for precedent creation.
If the United States adopts enhanced appeal of arbitration awards, it
need not fear isolation. Other nations, like England, allow greater
judicial review. 30 5 Indeed, unlimited appeal is allowed in Belgium and
France for domestic arbitrations and limited appeal is allowed in
England, Australia, and Hong Kong.30 6 New Zealand and Singapore
allow appeal "if the court finds that certain conditions have been met"most important, the30 7question must be on a point of law of "general
public importance.
There will undoubtedly be costs for enhanced appeal of arbitration
awards. Lawyers and judges are notoriously wedded to the language of
their professions-an amendment would require that they "must learn a
new lexicon of untested notions, procedures and nomenclature[;]
[w]ords that drew their meaning from decades of application must yield

298.

Park, supra note 5, at 64.

299. Id.
300. Anthony Diamond and V. V. Veeder, The New English Arbitration Act 1996: Challenging
an English Award Before the English Court, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 47, 47 (1997) (noting the

aspersions cast upon the special case procedure by practitioners).
301.

Park, supra note 5, at 64.

302. REPORT ON THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996, supra note 258, at 16 (60% of respondents
thought that the possibility of appealing should be retained in its current basis; 15% argued for
abolition of all appeal; and 20% recommended changing the tests for granting leave to appeal).
303. Id. at 17.
304. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, LONDON, LEGAL SERVICES 11 (2003), available

at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/research/index.html.
305. See, e.g., Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69.
306. van Ginkel, supranote 187, at 194-96.
307. Id.at 196.
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to inventive interpretation, perhaps increasing expensive litigation over
the meaning of novel concepts." 30 8 Learning and renewal, however,
come with each shift in American jurisprudence or congressional action.
An unwillingness to budge simply cannot be a sound reason to avoid
change.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration, as a dispute resolution regime, is both popular and
prevalent. Although arbitration is unlikely to overtake adjudication, we
must nonetheless be cognizant of the significant and deleterious effect
that overly expansive arbitral jurisdiction has on the development of
American law. In this age of arbitration, the challenge "will not be to
legitimate the arbitral process, but rather to find suitable means 3of9
placing necessary limits upon its newly found statutory autonomy. 0
The best limit for arbitration is not found in a constriction of the
jurisdiction or scope of arbitration. Rather, the best limit is one that
solves the risk to American jurisprudence-an enhanced appellate
process for arbitration awards. With limited appeals of arbitration
awards, the law may yet grow, statutes may yet be interpreted, and both
arbitration and adjudication will benefit from the achievement of greater
exactness.
Drew M Gulley*

308.
462-64.
309.

Park, supra note 5, at 65. This has been the case in England. See Clegg, supra note 267, at
Ulrich Drobnig, Assessing Arbitral Autonomy in European Statutory Law, in THOMAS

CARBONNEAU, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT

201 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed., rev. ed. 1998).
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